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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PREF](#) [RW](#)
SUBJECT: RWANDA - DEMARCHE ON EASTERN CONGO

REF: A. STATE 85390
[1](#)B. KINSHASA 630
[1](#)C. KIGALI 533

Classified By: CDA Cheryl Sim for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: Minister of Foreign Affairs Rosemary Museminali dismissed concerns about the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (ref A). In particular, she rejected any notion that the Government of Rwanda (GOR) continued to support Laurent Nkunda and the CNDP and allowed them to recruit in refugee camps. Museminali placed responsibility for the lack of progress in eastern Congo squarely on the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (GDRC) and its insufficient commitment to the Nairobi Communiqué and the Goma Agreement. With regard to the U.S. and UN sanctions committee investigating CNDP funding sources, she stated the GOR would be prepared to respond to any allegations that it funds the CNDP. Museminali firmly rejected the request that President Paul Kagame make a public statement on Nkunda. The GOR is looking at mid-October dates for the next Tripartite Plus meeting. The negative reaction to suggestions that Rwanda needs to do more to address the ongoing lack of security in eastern Congo is not surprising. Rwandan impatience and disdain with what they consider DRC inaction on the FDLR colors their perspective and provides GOR officials with a ready excuse not to seriously engage on Nkunda and the CNDP. End summary.

[1](#)2. (C) Charge, accompanied by poloff, delivered reftel demarche regarding the eastern Congo and perceptions of GOR support to Laurent Nkunda's CNDP to Minister of Foreign Affairs Rosemary Museminali on August 12. Museminali was largely dismissive of the notion that the GOR should be concerned about perceptions in the DRC over Rwanda's purported support for Nkunda and the CNDP. Rather, she asserted the onus was on the GDRC to take action to resolve the situation within its own borders. Pointing out the multiple mechanisms in place under which the GOR and GDRC can meet to discuss issues and concerns, such as the Tripartite Plus process and Joint Monitoring Group (JMG), she maintained the GOR remained fully prepared to participate and utilize them even though the GDRC clearly was not engaged. Furthermore, she added, the demarche would have been unnecessary if the GDRC had not found a suspect reason such as the "sham surrender" of the FDLR-RUD (ref B) to avoid coming to Kigali. She further derided that event and claimed demobilized combatants would simply return, with their weapons, to the fray.

[1](#)3. (C) Continuing, Museminali stated the GOR remained ready to establish diplomatic relations with the DRC and willing to help it in any way possible to "rebuild their own nation." She expressed frustration with the GDRC's lack of commitment to carry out previous agreements related to the peace process, including its inability to make progress in re-establishing diplomatic ties. She further said the GDRC

should share information through the Tripartite Fusion Cell, JMG and similar mechanisms instead of "passing rumors," adding that all of the recent stories about attacks on Goma in September were sourced back to the GDRC. In fact, she called the Congolese "rumor pros." Museminali called for increased pressure on the GDRC to meet its obligations and asked that the international community stop treating Kabila and his government "with kid gloves."

14. (C) Responding to the suggestions that Rwanda needed to tighten its border controls to prevent Nkunda and his supporters from recruiting in Congolese refugee camps, Museminali stated it was time for the refugees to go back to Congo. She also stated that given the situation in the DRC and the lack of GDRC commitment to resolve the problems in the Kivus, Nkunda did not have to come to Rwanda to recruit - he could find plenty of support on that side of the border. That stated, she offered her "highest assurances" that the GOR "has no business supporting the CNDP."

15. (C) Museminali also reacted negatively to the news that the USG was examining the sources of CNDP funding and that the UN Sanctions Committee was doing the same, saying she found it a "bit of a threat." She said the GOR would be pleased to respond to any information that the US or UN developed related to this. She firmly rejected the request for a public statement by President Paul Kagame on Nkunda, exasperatedly asking, "How many times does he have to say it (please see para 8 below)?" She was appreciative that the USG was making a similar presentation in Kinshasa and hoped it would be equally direct. The Foreign Minister ended her response to the demarche by reasserting the GOR remained willing to work toward resolution of conflict in the Congo. Charge suggested that it would be beneficial to set new dates for the next Tripartite Plus meeting in the near future so all parties could again be brought together. The Minister agreed, noting that she had been thinking about trying to arrange a meeting on the margins of the General Assembly, but had decided against it given "all the dashing about" that takes place in New York.

16. (C) Earlier in the day, Charge reviewed key demarche points with Great Lakes Envoy Ambassador Richard Sezibera who had indicated he was unable to attend the meeting with Minister Museminali. While deferring to the Minister to respond formally for the GOR, Sezibera made several comments. Sezibera stated that the GOR had repeatedly advised us that it has no contact with Nkunda, and that Nkunda and the CNDP are Congolese problems. He took exception to the contention that the FDLR, through lax GOR border control, was able to finance itself by exporting minerals out of Congo through Rwanda. He said the GOR would appreciate intelligence sharing bearing out the claim. On the issue of CNDP recruitment in refugee camps, Sezibera reiterated his previous comment (ref C) that Congolese refugees "need to go home." Finally, when told about the prospect of the US and the UN Sanctions committee investigating CNDP funding, he stated there was no equivalency between the FDLR and the CNDP, adding that linking sanctions against the FDLR to those against the CNDP would be "unacceptable" to the GOR.

17. (SBU) Charge asked if Sezibera had given any thought to October dates for the Tripartite Plus meeting. Sezibera, who has largely been unavailable for the past two weeks, said he would discuss mid-October dates with the MFA and get back to us.

18. (SBU) FYI: With regard to the Foreign Minister's comment that President Kagame has publicly distanced himself from Nkunda and the CNDP, Post found two press articles (one in English and the other in French) quoting President Kagame regarding Nkunda from September 2007 and April 2008. In the April article, Kagame characterized Nkunda and his movement as internal Congolese problems that Kabila needs to address. He further stated that if Nkunda were to become a problem for Rwanda, he would know what steps to take, but that was not

the case today. He also denied that Rwanda was "closing its eyes" to Nkunda's recruitment in the camps. In the September article, Kagame asserted that Nkunda has "a legitimate political grievance" with the DRC and a right to protect Congolese Tutsis. He rejected any effort to equate Nkunda's forces with the FDLR. He denied the GOR provided support to Nkunda and the CNDP. End FYI.

19. (C) Comment. The Minister's and Sezibera's reaction to suggestions that Rwanda needs to do more to address the ongoing lack of security in eastern Congo is not surprising. Their impatience and distain with what they consider DRC inaction on the FDLR colors their perspective and provides them with a ready excuse not to seriously engage on Nkunda and the CNDP. End Comment.
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